Member Platform - Lt. Col Fred Krawchuk

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Written in collaboration with Major General David P. Frodovich (USA), Commander, Special Operations Command - Pacific. With research support from Major Stacy Bathrick, SOCPAC’s Public Affairs Officer

Winning the Global War on Terrorism in the Pacific Region: Special Operations Forces’ Indirect Approach to Success

Introduction

Combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan continue to dominate headlines, but Southeast Asia has emerged as a quiet yet increasingly crucial front in the global war on terrorism (GWOT). Given the suicide bombings in Bali, the presence of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Abu Sayyaf (ASG), and increased anti-Americanism in the region1, we must emphasize the need for a continued, comprehensive approach to combating terrorism in the Pacific. To address the threat posed by militant terrorist groups with connections to al Qaeda, the United States Special Operations Command – Pacific (SOCPAC) has been improving ties with regional allies and increasingly applying an indirect approach.

The Indirect Approach

Addressing this threat requires a sophisticated and indirect approach.  The U.S. simply cannot enter sovereign countries unilaterally and conduct kill or capture missions.  We must blend host nation capacity building and other long-term efforts to address root causes, dissuade future terrorists and reduce recruiting. The 9/11 Commission Report emphatically states that the United States must "help defeat an ideology, not just a group of people."2

In order to address the underlying conditions that foster terrorism, SOCPAC works with its host nation partners in order to help provide security and stability.  This approach attracts economic development and shapes conditions for good governance and rule of law.  Much of SOCPAC’s activities consist of Foreign Internal Defense and Unconventional Warfare.3  Special Operations Forces’ (SOF’s) primary contribution in this interagency activity is to organize, train, and assist host nation security forces.  The indirect approach relies heavily on SOF’s capability to build host nation defense capacity, provide Civil Affairs forces to assist in humanitarian and civic assistance, and offer Information Operations assets to aid the host nation to win the war of ideas against violent ideological threats.

This indirect approach demands diplomacy and respecting political sensitivities.  SOCPAC focuses on working in harmony and close coordination with host nation military and political leadership, law enforcement, and U.S. country teams in the region (to include U.S. Agency for International Development and Department of State Public Diplomacy officials.) These stakeholders share the responsibility of capacity building, and leverage each others’ strengths and synchronize efforts.  In order to produce institutional change, host nation partners have to be willing to reform, as required.  Interagency and multinational will and capacity building must go hand-in-hand for the indirect approach to succeed.

Success is measured in terms of accomplishments through, by and with host nation partners.  Over time, our host nation partners are building a long lasting, self-sustaining capability to provide security, develop good governance, attract foreign direct investment, and counter violent ideology.  This approach is a slow process, and when done correctly, achieves lasting results.    Part of our commitment is to remain patient and focus on a long-term indirect approach that results in self-sustaining host nation partners. 

Relationships

Besides having a long-term outlook, relationships also play a vital role in SOCPAC’s indirect approach to combating terrorism.  SOCPAC members have a significant amount of regional experience and constructive relationships with other nations’ SOF and conventional force leadership.   Frequent deployments, exercises, and exchanges allow our personnel to immerse themselves in the region, build a socio-cultural knowledge base, and sustain relationships over an extended period of time.

As a result of our experiences, we know that we can be successful only through bi-lateral or multi-lateral cooperation.  Unilateral actions by the U.S. are neither necessary nor welcomed.4  Our partner nations willingly accept the lead in their respective countries.  Additionally, many nations prefer that the U.S. maintain a low visibility presence abroad, and we respect those requests.  SOF can do this with little external support and low overhead from higher headquarters, which supports the U.S. Department of Defense’s concept of small footprints in the region.  This method respects local populaces and can actually help increase the legitimacy and improve the image of the United States among host nation populations.5
 
By working closely with host nation partners and the country team, we create trust and credibility.  When we are in the “advise and assist” role, we have to be open with each other about the training needs of the security forces, and what capability we bring that can help build capacity.  Honest assessments and dedication on both sides to developing competent forces requires clear communication and hard work.  Being open to what the security environment and our partners are signaling is not the same as reacting to every criticism as a failure to be corrected.  Successful capacity building requires that we do not ignore feedback or overreact to every training setback.  Instead, we must continue to assess, adapt our training programs, and pay close attention to what capacities are improving.

The result of this focused training cycle produces quantifiable and observable results.  Typically, the host nation force performs a capabilities demonstration during a closing ceremony.  Host nation government and senior military officials, as well as U.S. Ambassadors, often attend these ceremonies.  The capabilities demonstration is visible proof of what the host nation’s military gained from our participation with them.  Tangible improvements and demonstrated abilities improve our credibility with host nation officials and U.S. Ambassadors alike.

Indirect Approach Elements

Three elements constitute SOCPAC’s indirect approach in the Pacific Region.  They are institution building, capacity building and outside factors.  These three elements influence whom we partner with, and the breadth and depth of those relationships.  Integrating the three parts provides a comprehensive approach to helping host nation partners become self-sufficient in their defense capabilities. 

• Institution Building - The broader populations who support terrorist groups are often economically and educationally deprived people.  The terrorist groups use this deprivation in a quid pro quo way; e.g., they give a child an education and at the same time provide radical indoctrination.  Finding a way to get there first and give people a leg up without creating resentment and before the terrorists can influence them is an important aspect of institutional building.  Special Operations Forces support those efforts to help a country build healthy institutions of security, good governance, rule of law, infrastructure, and economic stability.  Working with our host nation partners, U.S. embassy officials, and non-governmental organizations to help support and de-conflict institutional building efforts is vital to success in the indirect approach.
• Capacity Building – We work closely with host nation forces to assess their training needs and assist them in becoming a more professional and modernized force that respects human rights and civic society.  We always ensure that we are operating within the confines of political and legal constraints of the U.S. and the partner nation in terms of what we are allowed to do before committing to a training program.  A comprehensive capacity building program requires assessments of unit capabilities, cultural awareness of political-military sensitivities, appropriate training programs, expert SOF trainers, and validation of efforts.  Periodic follow-ups also help to institutionalize capacity building of the host nation military and other security forces.
• Outside factors - We acknowledge that the GWOT extends beyond the Pacific Region.  Today, the majority of SOF are deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan.  This reality requires us to do more with less.   We must prioritize where we go, what we do and ensure we can manage expectations.  Outside factors also include external support of terrorist organizations in the form of finance, logistics, equipment, communication networks, and ideology.  Working closely with host nation forces and U.S. country team officials to help eliminate the lifeline of transnational threats is an important requirement.  

For more than five years, our involvement in the GWOT in the Pacific Region has been a consistent, on-going effort in these three areas.  Today, we partner with 10 countries and participate in more than 50 military-to-military events per year.  This indirect approach has been and will continue to be a slow and deliberate process that requires commitment to building trust and confidence throughout the region.  We have to remain dedicated to the indirect approach, knowing that we are not going to see results immediately.  The three elements offer an integrated solution in which we partner with host nation organizations in order to help create an environment where security and rule of law can flourish.

Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines

SOCPAC’s continued contribution to its counterparts in the Philippines is a demonstrable example of a successful interagency, multinational indirect approach to combating terrorism. In the aftermath of 9/11, we deployed to the Muslim south of the Philippines for the first time since World War II to assist the Philippine military and civilian population in light of the security challenges in Basilan.  This was an important task because the rest of Southeast Asia was watching to see if the U.S. military would honor its words with action.
We arrived in the southern Philippines in January 2002 with the mission to advise and assist the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) on Basilan Island, which would then conduct operations against the ASG.  We operated under very strict rules of engagement, and stayed in the background and ensured the AFP was up front.  At the time, Basilan Island was known to the AFP and local population as a terrorist safe haven.  The first thing we did when we hit the ground was assess the units we would work with and conduct a series of population surveys. We wanted to know what the people of Basilan needed in order to sever their ties with the ASG and look positively upon the AFP.  The islanders' biggest concerns were water, security, medical care, education, and roads.  Addressing those needs meant digging wells and building roads so that they could enjoy a better life. We also worked with our counterparts to build piers and an airstrip for AFP operations. We planned for this infrastructure to be left behind for the benefit of the AFP and civilian population. 

These collaborative efforts helped us gain the confidence of our counterparts and the local population through a variety of engineering, medical, and community outreach projects. The AFP led efforts in setting successful security conditions that enabled expanding capacity building efforts.  Within a few months, we received additional forces that extended our humanitarian assistance efforts.  Our units, working side by side with the Filipinos, began improving schools, hospitals, and mosques.  The local population became very supportive of the U.S. and AFP military presence, and the AFP increasingly developed trust in our “advise and assist” role.    

After two years on Basilan Island, the environment no longer fostered terrorist activities and the ASG left the island.  The AFP effectively “drained the swamp” of underlying conditions with our assistance.  The Basilan people now live in a safer and more secure environment. As a result, the AFP downsized their presence from 15 infantry battalions down to 2 battalions.  By guaranteeing security, the AFP made it safe for teachers and doctors to return to Basilan.   

Private business and non-governmental organizations also operate in an area they once shunned. The AFP won back the support of the local population and the Philippine government, producing a long-lasting effect. 

Another indicator of success came from the islanders themselves.  The Basilan people chose to support the government and not the ASG. The local populace saw value in supporting the government because the AFP was more powerful and legitimate than the terrorists.  The indirect approach of the Basilan model enabled the AFP to provide the local populace with a stable security environment that enabled commerce and significant quality of life improvements.

Archipelago Region

Due to the transnational nature of terrorist organizations, the Archipelago of the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia is a key region where we presently focus our indirect efforts.  Our approach in working with the Archipelago region is similar to the approach we took in Basilan, and has been adapted to the unique socio-economic and geographic characteristics of the region.  Once stability and good governance is created in the outer islands, then non-governmental and private organizations will be more likely to operate there because they realize the areas are safer.  Commerce will also most likely expand in these regions due to a more stable environment.  

First steps in this region include re-establishing ties with the Indonesia military in a steady and unhurried manner.  We first engaged with their military through a series of two-week Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEEs) and post-Tsunami civic action projects.  After conducting five SMEEs and several humanitarian assistance projects in an eight-month period, the Indonesian military approached us with interest in expanding our role to advise and assist their military forces.

The SMEEs and civil military operations set the conditions for continuing our partnership with the Indonesian military. We have now completed six combined events and several construction projects with the Indonesian military. This has increased the trust and confidence between our forces, so now we are planning to conduct more events in the future.
We have also started achieving stronger military-to-military relationships in Malaysia. Our success with the Malaysian forces focuses largely on partnering during multinational naval exercises. The events in which we participated were mutually beneficial. The world-class training events and professionalism of our forces impressed the Malaysian military. We gained immensely from their state-of-the-art training facilities that assisted our efforts to execute realistic training scenarios. Strengthening ties with the three Archipelago nations builds a solid foundation for a multilateral indirect approach to address transnational security concerns in the region.

Thailand

In addition to the three Archipelago nations, we count on Thailand as an important partner in the region. For many years we have enjoyed a rich relationship with the Thai military. We consistently participate in a variety of combined training and exercises with the Thai military, maintaining relationships with several units over long periods of time. This military partnership is an excellent example of how important it is to continue building on the trust we have established with our host nation partners.

The Thai military gives us solid, strong and quiet support. They have asked for our assistance in advising and assisting in areas of concern, and they provide us constructive feedback on our indirect approach. Because our relationship is so strong, they feel comfortable coming to us in complete candor to tell us when our specific approach does not work for them, and how we might improve. They are also open to our feedback, so we learn together. This is a sure indicator of a firm relationship that has formed over a long period of time.

Effects-Based Measurement Tool

In the end, the only meaningful criteria for judging SOF’s strategy and operations in the war on terrorism in Southeast Asia are the effective and successful results and changes that ensue. SOCPAC has established an effects-based assessment system that takes a close look at our return on investment regarding our activities with host nation partners. Based on the nation we are partnering with, we measure the effects on a quarterly basis.

The concept of our effects-based system is to assess how well we are doing with building strong relationships and improving capacity - not simply counting the number of activities. Our intent is to measure how effectively we assist host nation partners in winning over populations and developing institutions of stability. We have learned that we are making long-lasting progress, and that the results are not instant. As a result of this analytical feedback loop, the effects-based approach helps us to prioritize our efforts, shift resources, and ensure our indirect approach remains focused and balanced in the region.

The Way Ahead

Given our success in the southern Philippines, we plan to partner with other countries to achieve similar effects, with host nation forces in the lead. Every situation is different and requires an intelligent approach that is appropriate to the local context and needs of the stakeholders. Our approach in other Asian nations will be methodical. It shall focus on assessing underlying conditions and host nation units, improving the local socio-economic and security situation at hand, enhancing the legitimacy of local government, and severing ties with terrorists.

Five to ten years from now we will be working with new partner nations while sustaining the relationships we have built over time. We have anchored relationships in the Philippines and Thailand, and will continue growing our partnerships in Malaysia and Indonesia. We will most likely broaden our indirect approach efforts to include working by, through, and with forces in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and India. Our approach will continue to develop new, trusting relationships with the host nation partners in the lead. We will engage these nations in a purposeful manner to make sure we can build successful relationships just as we have in Southeast Asia.

As we build partnerships with new countries, we look forward to establishing strong links to the respective U.S. embassies, and Asian multilateral security organizations as needed and where appropriate. If we want to continue to diffuse terrorist organizations, we need to work together to offer alternative ideologies, economic opportunity, safety, different channels for political influence to travel, and ways to strengthen family and cultural ties outside of terrorist movements.  With a better understanding of the concerns of stakeholders, we will be better able to provide more appropriate alternatives to political violence.  This requires leveraging the knowledge and capabilities of U.S. and host nation diplomatic, informational, economic, financial, military, and law enforcement instruments of power in a coordinated and focused effort.

Conclusion

SOF is uniquely organized and equipped to win in the challenging unconventional warfare environment of the 21st century.  SOCPAC has proven this over time in Thailand and in the Philippines, and the benefits are becoming clearer every day in Indonesia and Malaysia.  SOCPAC, through its actions and tangible results, has clearly demonstrated that the indirect approach is an effective and successful model for addressing asymmetric threats. By working with host nation and U.S. country team partners, we help produce stability so that political and social grievances can be adequately addressed through good governance and economic development. The indirect approach promotes the legitimacy of the host nation government and gains support of the local populace, which are key elements in winning a successful campaign against transnational threats.

By actively implementing an indirect approach, we have established that security shapes conditions so that commerce, rule of law, and education can flourish and provide alternatives to violence and despair.  Relationships with host nation counterparts have provided us with a robust exchange of actionable recommendations that promote measurable results.  This innovative approach is certainly relevant in an increasingly complex security environment.  Working by, through, and with our multinational and interagency partners will be absolutely critical to our continued success in combating terrorism in the Pacific.

Footnotes

1. Pew Global Attitudes Project: America's Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran, Hamas, June 13, 2006.
2. 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004), p. 376.
3. Joint Publication 3-07.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (Norfolk, VA, 2004), Foreign Internal Defense (FID) “is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.”  Unconventional Warfare (UW) builds on the foundation of working by, through, and with indigenous or surrogate forces.  Although the military and law enforcement agencies kill, capture and detain terrorists, these direct action missions should not be at the expense of the “advise and assist” approach that FID and UW offer as their centerpiece.  Working through, by, and with host nation counterparts, to include training in human rights and respect for civil authorities, should be at the core of any successful counterterrorist or counterinsurgency strategy.  Both FID and UW are essential to building capacity among friends, allies, and coalition partners, which will help deter terrorism and insurgency.  SOF are the only forces able to conduct sustained unconventional operations in the heart of areas in which terrorists freely operate.  They are trained, equipped, and educated for conducting unconventional warfare in an uncertain environment. 
4. Fred Krawchuk, Combating Terrorism: A Joint/Interagency Approach, (Washington, DC: AUSA, January 2005), pp. 12-13.
5. RAND Study: DRR 3550-OSD (unpublished draft), (Washington, DC: RAND Corporation, 2005), p. 42.  “U.S. SOF are also expert in training indigenous forces about how to win the trust of their fellow citizens, how to most effectively protect those citizens from insurgent attack and reprisals, as well as in organizing indigenous populations for their own self-defense and giving them a stake in the outcome of their government’s success.  SOF, because of their intimate understanding of unconventional environments, can thereby play a pivotal role directly in promoting sound civil-military relations and building public confidence in the government while simultaneously working with HN forces to deprive terrorists and insurgents of popular support.  The foreign language capabilities and communications skills of SOF, their cultural awareness and sensitivity, and their training and experience in working directly with local civilians, police and their military counterparts alike, arguably enable special forces to achieve superior results.”